Child and Family Law Journal
Volume 4 | Issue 1

Article 4

2016

Victims With Responsibilities: Requiring Male
Victims Of Statutory Rape To Pay Child Support
With No Escape
Jessica Persaud

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Persaud, Jessica (2016) "Victims With Responsibilities: Requiring Male Victims Of Statutory Rape To Pay Child Support With No
Escape," Child and Family Law Journal: Vol. 4 : Iss. 1 , Article 4.
Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj/vol4/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Child and Family Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law.

Victims with Responsibilities:
Requiring Male Victims of Statutory Rape to Pay
Child Support with No Escape
Jessica Persaud*
I. INTRODUCTION: STATUTORY RAPE AND THE MALE VICTIM
In September of 2014, USA TODAY released the story of Nick
Olivas who was ordered to pay child support, including retro-active
support, for a daughter whom he did not know existed for six years; she
was conceived in Arizona when he was just fourteen years old and the
mother was twenty.1 According to Arizona law, it is a crime to engage in
sexual activity with a minor under the age of fifteen.2 Olivas never
pressed charges because “he didn’t realize at the time that it was even
something to consider.”3 According to a USA TODAY statistic, as of
January 24, 2015, Olivas’ story was the eighth most viewed article on
USA TODAY’s website, with sixty-four reader comments offered in
response.4 It is apparent that the issue of a victim of statutory rape being
ordered to pay child support is intriguing to many people. Despite the
recent attention this issue is receiving, this is not a new phenomenon.
Cases dating back to 1961 have addressed the issue of how to handle
child support liability when the father is the victim of statutory rape.5
Although not the legal term, statutory rape is the common
pseudonym for crimes that involve sexual activity between a minor and
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Alia Beard Rau, Statutory Rape Victim Forced to Pay Child Support, USA TODAY
(Sept. 3, 2014), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/09/02/
statutory-rape-victim-child-support/14953965/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (Originally
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an adult.6 Though most may think of young girls and older men in these
scenarios, adolescent boys are victims of these crimes as well.
Relationships involving older women and younger boys have appeared in
various news reports.7 One such report involved a Lakeland, Florida
teacher, Jennifer Fichter, who became sexually involved with her male
students.8 However, female teachers are not the sole perpetrators of these
crimes. Analyzing data provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
the U.S. Department of Justice reported in 2005 that five percent of
statutory rape victims were males between the ages of seven and
seventeen, with twenty-nine percent of the victims being fifteen years
old.9 Additionally, of the offenders in cases of statutory rape on males,
ninety-four percent were female and seventy percent were age twentyone or older.10
Scenarios of young boys and older women have often been depicted
in movies such as Class,11 Harold and Maude,12 The Reader,13 and The
Boy Next Door.14 Released in January 2015, the Boy Next Door is about a
high school boy’s mother who has a sexual encounter with her son’s
schoolmate who lives across the street. As in many of the movies
depicting sexual relationships between boys and older women,15 the
young male in The Boy Next Door is made to be the aggressor, with the
main plot of the movie revolving around the obsession he develops for
the mother living next door.16
Hollywood is not alone in its characterization of male statutory rape
victims as non-victims. The courts’ decisions in these cases reveal a
perception that young males who have sex with older women are eager
and willing participants, thus, they must financially support any children
6

OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
JUVENILE JUSTICE BULL. NO. 208803, Statutory Rape Known to Law Enforcement (Aug.
2005) [herein referred to as O.J.J.D.P], available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
ojjdp/208803.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
7
Ryan Raiche, Teacher Jennifer Fichter Charged with Having Sex with Third Student,
ABC ACTION NEWS (WFTS Tampa Bay), June 5, 2014, available at
http://www.abcactionnews.com/news/region-polk/teacher-jennifer-fichter-charged-withhaving-sex-with-third-student (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
8
Id.
9
O.J.J.D.P., supra note 6.
10
O.J.J.D.P., supra note 6.
11
CLASS (Orion Pictures 1983).
12
HAROLD AND MAUDE (Paramount Pictures 1971).
13
THE READER (Mirage Enterprises 2008).
14
THE BOY NEXT DOOR (Universal Pictures 2015).
15
See generally Older Women Younger Man Hot Whole Movies, IMDB.COM,
http://www.imdb.com/list/ls070061866/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (Lists several plot
lines of movies relating to these relationships).
16
THE BOY NEXT DOOR, supra note 14.
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which result from the illegal sexual encounters. In these cases, the rights
of these male victims are given last priority. The resultant child’s right to
support from the parent is seen as paramount, and female victims have
the opportunity to avoid parenthood through abortion or adoption, which
are not options available to male victims.17
The purpose of this note is to address the contradictory nature of
holding male victims of statutory rape liable for child support and to
propose a way of handling these cases that would take the male victims’
rights into consideration. Part II will include a discussion of the
background and evolution of the relevant laws. Part III will introduce
some of the rulings courts have reached on this issue and their reasoning.
Part IV will examine the idea of consent, and provide a closer look at the
effects that this practice has on the male victims. Finally, Part V will
present the policy recommendation of allowing these male victims to
terminate their parental rights and responsibilities if they so choose.
II. BACKGROUND OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS
Today, all states have adopted laws that are characterized as
statutory rape laws.18 The age of consent and provisions addressing age
differentials between victims and offenders vary by state, but the
majority of states set the age of consent at sixteen.19 Most of the statutes
are now gender neutral, affording protection to minor females as well as
males.20 Gender neutrality was not always the norm in statutory rape
laws and the purposes behind these laws have also changed over time.21
The Statute of Westminster of 1275 was the first codified English
statutory rape law.22 Originally, these laws were intended to protect the
chastity of young girls because they were deemed property of their
fathers until they were married and became property of their husbands.23
The focus was not on the consequences to the victimized girl, but rather
on the father’s financial interests because a non-virgin was less valuable
upon marriage or risked never being married, thus becoming the life-long
17

See infra Part III and Part IV.C.
Asaph Glosser et al., Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting
Requirements, 5-9 (Dec. 15, 2004), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/08/sr/statelaws/
summary.shtml (last visited Dec. 1, 2015) (Prepared for U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See infra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
22
Michelle Oberman, Girls in the Master’s House: Of Protection, Patriarchy and the
Potential for Using the Master’s Tools to Reconfigure Statutory Rape Law, 50 DEPAUL
L. REV. 799, 800-01 and n.2 (2001).
23
Id. at 802-03.
18
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financial responsibility of her father.24 Under these early laws, persuasive
and forceful sexual relationships with young girls were equally
punishable.25
Statutory rape laws became a part of American common law along
with the rest of English common law.26 Although these laws initially
established the age of consent to be ten years old, by the beginning of the
twentieth century, the average age of consent was raised to sixteen.27
Some say this change is reflective of a shift from the idea that young
girls were unable to legally consent to the theory that these girls needed
to be protected from even consensual, non-marital sexual intercourse.28
Interestingly, the focus on protection of the sexuality of young women is
what prompted the 1970’s “second wave” feminists to seek gender
neutrality in statutory rape laws.29 They believed that statutory rape laws
furthered gender stereotypes and threatened the sexual autonomy of
young women, but they also understood the critical importance of
protecting young individuals from sexual coercion.30 In November of
1979, the Supreme Court of California heard the case of Michael M. v.
Superior Court, in which Michael sought a writ of prohibition to have his
conviction for statutory rape dismissed, claiming that the California
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution because it
discriminated on the basis of gender.31 The court denied the writ of
prohibition determining it was not unconstitutional to provide protection
to only females because there were other statutes such as “contributing to
the delinquency of a minor,” to protect males.32 Additionally, the court
determined the statute was constitutional because the purpose of the
statute was to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies, from which only
female victims could suffer.33 The Supreme Court of the United States

24

Id.
Id. at 801.
26
Id. at 803.
27
Id.
28
Anthony M. Amelio, Florida’s Statutory Rape Law: A Shield or A Weapon? - A
Minor’s Right of Privacy Under Florida Statutes § 794.05, B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256
(Fla. 1995), 26 STETSON L. REV. 407, 410-11 (1996).
29
See Oberman, supra note 22, at 803.
30
Oberman, supra note 22 at 803.
31
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 610 (1979), aff’d sub nom. Michael M.
v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
32
Id.
33
Id. at 610.
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2016]

Victims with Responsibilities

83

affirmed the decision in March of 1981.34 Despite the Court’s holding,
most jurisdictions adopted gender neutral statutes during the 1980s.35
The emphasis on preventing teenage pregnancy was reiterated in
the 1990’s, when studies revealed that an alarming number of babies
born to teen mothers were fathered by adult men.36 Studies also showed
that teenage mothers were more likely to utilize public assistance;
therefore, the adult fathers cost states millions of dollars in public
assistance funds.37 These findings led to policies that encouraged
prosecution in statutory rape cases with an emphasis on those cases with
a wide age gap between the victims and offenders.38
Florida’s first statutory rape law, Florida Statute § 2598, appeared
in 1892 and allowed for a death sentence.39 Different versions of the
1892 statute were in effect until replaced in 1975 by the Sexual Battery
statute, Florida Statute § 794.011.40 Judge W. Sharp noted in his
concurrence in Jones v. State, “Florida has long adhered to a policy of
protecting minors from sexual exploitation and abuse.”41 He further
stated that in 1943 the Florida Legislature expanded its policy of
protection by enacting Florida Statue § 800.04, which prohibits lewd and
lascivious activity with minors under sixteen.42 Currently, Florida
Statutes § 800.04 and § 794.05 are the controlling statutory rape laws in
Florida.43 Section 800.04 reads in pertinent part:
(2) Prohibited defenses. Neither the victim’s lack of chastity nor
the victim’s consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by this
section.
…
(4) Lewd or lascivious battery.
(a) A person commits lewd or lascivious battery by:

34

Michael M., 450 U.S. at 476.
Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of
Statutory Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from Their Victimization?, 36
GA. L. REV. 411, 430-31 (2002).
36
Oberman, supra note 22, at 808-09.
37
Oberman, supra note 22, at 808-09.
38
Oberman, supra note 22, at 809.
39
Jones v. State, 619 So. 2d 418, 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) approved 640 So. 2d
1084 (Fla. 1994).
40
Id.
41
Id. at 423.
42
Id. at 424.
43
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 800.04, 794.05 (West 2014).

35
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1. Engaging in sexual activity with a person 12
years of age or older but less than 16 years of
age; or
2. Encouraging, forcing, or enticing any person
less than 16 years of age to engage in
sadomasochistic abuse, sexual bestiality,
prostitution, or any other act involving sexual
activity.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (c), an offender who
commits lewd or lascivious battery commits a felony of the
second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.084.44

Section 794.05 provides additional protection for children who are
sixteen or seventeen years old against sexual activity with adults who are
twenty-four years or older and states:
(1) A person 24 years of age or older who engages in sexual
activity with a person 16 or 17 years of age commits a felony of
the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.084. As used in this section, “sexual activity”
means oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the
sexual organ of another or the anal or vaginal penetration of
another by any other object; however, sexual activity does not
include an act done for a bona fide medical purpose.
…
(4) If an offense under this section directly results in the victim
giving birth to a child, paternity of that child shall be established
as described in chapter 742. If it is determined that the offender is
the father of the child, the offender must pay child support
pursuant to the child support guidelines described in chapter 61.45

Clearly, Florida is still concerned with protecting young people
from sexual activity with an emphasis on those encounters where the
victim is much younger than the offender.

44
45

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.04 (West 2014).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 2014).
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III. COURT RESPONSES TO MALE VICTIMS/FATHERS
When faced with cases seeking child support from male victims of
statutory rape, courts have repeatedly held the male victims liable.46 In
the first line of its opinion, County of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J.,
the court opined, “[v]ictims have rights. Here, the victim also has
responsibilities.”47 As determined by the Fifth District Court of Appeals
of Florida in Department of Revenue v. Miller, “[Fla. Stat. §
794.011(8)(b)] does not create a defense for minor putative fathers in
paternity actions.”48 In these cases, the courts have determined that the
crime of statutory rape is irrelevant to a paternity and child support
case.49
One justification given by many courts for finding that the crime is
irrelevant is that the right of the resultant children to receive support
outweighs any policy to protect minors from sexual encounters.50 The
Court of Appeals of Kentucky has noted, “. . . this state’s strong public
policy requiring fathers to support their out-of-wedlock children must
take preference over any policy which may be embodied in our statutory
rape legislation to protect the victims of such crimes. . . .”51 Likewise, the
Third District Appellate Court of Illinois has determined that public
policy of mandated child support “overrides” policies of protecting
minors against “improvident acts.”52
Another, and perhaps the most concerning reason many courts have
given is that the boys/fathers are willing participants, not victims.53 In
Jevning v. Cichos, the father was a fifteen-year-old boy and the mother
was a twenty-year-old woman.54 The Court of Appeals of Minnesota
referred to the boy on numerous occasions using the term “victim” in
quotation marks and said, “[i]t is hard to characterize appellant as the
classic innocent victim of a crime.”55 The Supreme Court of Kansas used
the same approach in State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, a case in which
the thirteen-year-old male victim’s babysitter became pregnant and was
adjudicated for a lessor crime of contributing to a child’s misconduct.56
46

See cases cited infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
Cnty. of San Luis Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 843 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996).
48
Dep’t of Revenue v. Miller, 688 So.2d 1024, 1025 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
49
See cases cited infra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
50
See cases cited infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
51
Commonwealth ex rel. Rush v. Hatfield, 929 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996).
52
In re Parentage of J.S., 550 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
53
State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1279 (1993).
54
Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d 515, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
55
Id. at 515-16.
56
Hermesmann, 847 P.2d at 1274.
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The court in Hermesmann referred to the resultant child as “. . . the only
truly innocent party. . . .”57 Similarly, in Nathanial J., where the victim
was a fifteen-year-old boy and the offender was a thirty-four-year-old
woman, the Second District Courts of Appeals of California determined,
“[t]he law should not except Nathaniel J. from his responsibility because
he is not an innocent victim of Jones’s criminal acts.”58 The court went
on to find that the victim and offender “decided” to have sex.59 In In re
Paternity of J.L.H., the victim said that the sex was non-consensual and
that he suffered from psychosis and was unable to support himself
because of the sexual assault.60 Nevertheless, the court held him liable
for support, finding that he had not made a showing to support the
assertion that the sexual encounter was non-consensual, and that his
psychiatric issues were to be considered only as it pertained to child
support amounts.61
The Fifth District Court of Appeals of Florida adopted the
reasoning of the courts in Hermesmann and Paternity of J.L.H. in its case
of first impression, Department of Revenue v. Miller.62 Bennett was a
twenty-year-old woman who was living with fifteen-year-old Miller and
his family when conception occurred.63 The trial court originally
dismissed the petition for paternity, holding that Miller could not be
financially liable because he was a victim of sexual battery.64 The
appellate court reversed, however, finding that the trial court erred
because the sexual battery statute was not related to child support.65 In its
opinion, the court noted that neither it nor the cases it relied upon had
addressed the issue of whether “actual nonconsent” could be a defense in
a paternity proceeding.66
On the one hand, courts are determining that the issue of consent is
irrelevant in these civil proceedings, but on the other hand they are
saying that the minor fathers are willing participants and situations of
nonconsensual sex are not being discussed.67 Obviously, the issue of
consent is relevant and the courts have decided, even when the fathers
stated otherwise, that they were capable of and did consent.
57

Id. at 1279.
Nathaniel J., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843-45.
59
Id. at 845.
60
In re Paternity of J.L.H., 149 Wis. 2d 349, 355 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989).
61
Id. at 360.
62
Miller, 688 So.2d at 1026.
63
Id. at 1025.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 1026.
67
See Dep’t of Revenue v. Miller, 688 So.2d 1024, 1026 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); see
also State ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d 1273, 1277 (1993).
58
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IV. THE COURTS ARE DOING THESE MALE VICTIMS AN
INJUSTICE
When making decisions in cases seeking child support from male
victims of statutory rape, the courts are relying heavily on the fact that
these males are not considered victims because they “consented” to sex.68
This idea is not only contradictory to what scientific studies have shown
about adolescent psychological development,69 but also to what many
other areas of the law have already recognized about the decision-making
skills of minors.70 By relying so heavily on the consent facet, the courts
holding these minors liable for support are largely ignoring the
discriminatory and negative effects this practice has on male victims.71
A. “Consent” is Not Always Consent
Scientific studies have shown that minors do not possess the same
decision making abilities as adults.72 Furthermore, what may be seen as
consent by a minor may be more akin to acquiescence.73 Children
generally enter puberty and begin to undergo significant physical,
cognitive, and psychological changes between the ages of ten and
fourteen.74 An important physical change is the doubling of the gray
matter of the brain, which enables high cognitive functioning—typically
peaking around age seventeen in boys.75 The frontal cortex of the brain
controls regulation of emotions, impulse control, and planning, and
continues to develop through young adulthood.76 It is generally accepted
that an immature frontal cortex is at least partially responsible for the
tendency of adolescents to engage in more risky behaviors.77 Other areas
of the brain, which control decision-making, social skills, and problem
solving, also continue to develop throughout adolescence.78
Studies suggest that adolescents differ cognitively from adults in
that they are more concerned with conformity, have an exaggerated sense
of emotions, and believe that negative influences cannot affect them.79
68

See cases cited supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
See infra Part IV.A.
70
See infra Part IV.A.
71
See infra Part IV.A-C.
72
Jennifer Ann Drobac, “Developing Capacity”: Adolescent “Consent” at Work, at Law,
and in the Sciences of the Mind, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (2006).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 11-12.
75
Id. at 13.
76
Id. at 14.
77
Id.
78
Drobac, supra note 72, at 15.
79
Drobac, supra note 72, at 24-25.
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Psychological research has shown that adolescents tend to be more
influenced by others and display more impulsive and “sensation-seeking
behavior” than adults.80 The tendency to be heavily influenced by others
was evidenced in a 2000 Kaiser Family Foundation and Seventeen
Magazine survey of 510 teens, in which forty-five percent of the
respondents chose “other person wanted to” as a “major reason” for
having sex for the first time.81 It is not just teenage girls who are being
influenced by others to have sex.82 A 2003 Kaiser Family Foundation
study further revealed that eighteen percent of males reported having
engaged in sexual activity when they did not actually want to, and
eighty-six percent of twelve to seventeen-year-old participants reported
facing “some” or “a lot” of pressure to have sex.83
The Supreme Court discussed these developmental differences at
length in Roper v. Simmons, a case which challenged the constitutionality
of imposing the death penalty on juveniles.84 The Court conceded the
fact that juveniles are less mature, more reckless, more susceptible to
negative influences, and have more transitory personalities than adults.85
In light of these facts the Court held “[t]he differences between juvenile
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk allowing
a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite insufficient
culpability.”86
When Florida Statute § 800.04 faced a constitutionality challenge in
Jones v. State, the Florida Supreme Court also recognized the physical
and psychological developmental processes of minors in finding that
Florida was obligated to protect minors from sexual activity before their
minds and bodies are mature enough for it to be healthy and safe.87
Additionally, the Court acknowledged the doubtfulness of a minor’s
consent and said, “[w]e are of the opinion that sexual activity with a
child opens the door to sexual exploitation, physical harm, and
sometimes psychological damage, regardless of the child’s maturity or
lack of chastity.”88 In his strong concurrence, Justice Kogan addressed
80

Drobac, supra note 72, at 29.
Drobac, supra note 72, at 41-42.
82
Tina Hoff et al., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG ADULTS: SEXUAL
HEALTH KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES, 8 (2003), available at
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/national-survey-ofadolescents-and-young-adults.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
83
Id.
84
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005).
85
Id.
86
Id. at 572-73.
87
Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994).
88
Id. at 1087 (quoting Schmitt v. State, 619 So. 2d 404, 424 (Fla. 1991).
81
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the question of whether children and adolescents can consent to sex.89 He
expressed deep concern that deciding children and adolescents can
consent leads to a “slippery slope of the worst magnitude” and that it will
create a “convenient smoke screen for a predatory exploitation of
children and young adolescents.”90 Citing to a scientific study, which
supports the fact that adolescents do not think like adults, Kogan pointed
out that without accounting for the psychological differences, sexual
exploitation may appear to be consensual from an adult perspective.91
The appearance of consent can be enhanced when a child or
adolescent—due to fear, shame, coercion, or the belief that they must
obey adults for example—does not report the abuse or later retracts the
claim of exploitation.92 The concept of consent in cases of male
victimization is especially troubling when considering that victimized
boys may often think of themselves as guilty and, due to a natural desire
to preserve feelings of masculinity, are not able to admit that they lost
control and were victimized.93 As stated by author and psychologist Mic
Hunter, and quoted by Justice Kogan:
In many cases, the duration and nature of sexual encounters
between a male child and his perpetrator bear the external
trappings of consensual contact. Like a veil, the notion of consent
conceals the underlying coercion and manipulation experienced
by the victim. Loss of control, or being overpowered … may be
emotionally inaccessible or inapplicable to male victims. The
dynamic of vulnerability lies outside the emotional vocabulary of
many “normal” males.94

The idea that these male victims of statutory rape consented to the
sexual intercourse is entirely contradictory to not only the structure of the
statutory rape laws themselves,95 but also to discussions and policies
relating to minors in many other areas of the law.96 Restrictions on the
minimum age for voting,97 jury duty,98 marriage,99 and application of the
89

Id. at 1088-91.
Id. at 1088-89.
91
Id. at 1090 (citing Roland C. Summitt, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation
Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983)).
92
Id.
93
Jones, 640 So 2d 1084, 1090-91 (Kogan, J. concurring) (citing MIC HUNTER, THE
SEXUALLY ABUSED MALE, VOL. 1 PREVALENCE, IMPACT, & TREATMENT, 79 (JosseyBass, 1st ed. 1990)).
94
Id. at 1090 (quoting HUNTER, supra note 93).
95
See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.04(2) (West 2014) (consent is not a defense).
96
See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
97
FLA. STAT. § 97.041 (2009). (minimum age of eighteen).
98
FLA. STAT. § 40.01 (2003). (minimum age of eighteen).

90
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death penalty100 are all rooted in the fact that minors do not have the
same decision making capacity as adults.101
A minor’s diminished capacity to consent is also considered in civil
settings such as contract law where contracts made with minors are
voidable.102 This fact is also acknowledged by courts who hold that
liability waivers signed by minors are voidable.103 In Dilallo v. Riding
Safely, a thirteen-year-old girl signed a liability waiver before being
injured while horseback riding.104 The trial court found that the girl had
assumed the risk after she signed the written release, but the appellate
court reversed holding, “we adopt the rationale of Byrne in order to
effectuate this state’s policy of protecting minors. We now hold that a
minor child injured because of a defendant’s negligence is not bound by
her contractual waiver of her right to file a lawsuit.”105
In light of the scientific findings and legal recognition of the limited
capacity of adolescents to make decisions, it seems counter-intuitive to
then suggest that male victims of statutory rape consent to the illegal
sexual intercourse that forces them into fatherhood.
B. Teenage Fatherhood Can Have Negative Effects on Male
Victims
There has been little research conducted on how males are affected
by teenage fatherhood; however, that which has been conducted tends to
show a negative impact on the economic and social affairs of teenage
fathers.106 The Department of Justice has taken note of the negative
effects that teenage fatherhood can produce.107 In February of 2000, the
Department of Justice issued a news release entitled Teenage Fatherhood
Increases Likelihood of Juvenile Delinquency, which discussed two
studies conducted in Rochester, New York and Pittsburgh,
99

FLA. STAT. § 741.04(1) (2004). (minimum age of eighteen with some exceptions under
§741.0405).
100
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
101
Id. at 569.
102
5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9:5 (4th ed. 2015).
103
Dilallo v. Riding Safely, Inc., 687 So. 2d 353-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
104
Id. at 354.
105
Id. at 357.
106
Jones, supra note 35, at 463 n.9. (“There has been limited research on unwed fathers
but the available research suggests that becoming an unwed father limits the future
economic opportunities of the male parent.”); see also Press Release, Teenage
Fatherhood Increases Likelihood of Juvenile Delinquency, Department of Justice, Office
of Justice Programs (Feb. 3, 2000) available at http://ojp.gov/archives/pressreleases/
2000/ojp000203.html;Teen Parent Graduation and College Achievement Act, H.R. 5460,
111th Cong. (2009).
107
Press Release, supra note 106.
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Pennsylvania.108 The studies found there was a thirty-one percent higher
incident of court petitions alleging delinquency for teenage fathers than
non-fathers.109 Additionally, there was a twenty-percent increase in both
frequent alcohol use and drug dealing and a twenty-three percent
increase in school dropout rates for teenage fathers.110 Speaking about
these findings, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) administrator Shay Bilchick said, ‘“…fatherhood can
exacerbate an already troubled and stressful life, making a bad situation
worse….”‘111
The Department of Justice is not alone in its acknowledgement of
the negative repercussions parenthood can have on teenage males. In
2010, Congress proposed the Teen Parent Graduation and College
Achievement Act, which was intended to establish grant programs to
help keep pregnant and parenting students in school.112 The
congressional findings included the facts that teenage fathers completed
an average of one less semester of high school, that pregnancy and
parenting interfered with the attainment of a college degree, and that
fewer economic opportunities were available to teenage parents.113
C. There Are Options Available to Female Victims but Not to Male
Victims
While female victims of statutory rape have the opportunity to
avoid the financial responsibility of raising a resultant child by either
placing the child up for adoption114 or having an abortion,115 these
options are not available to male victims. In 1989, the Florida Supreme
Court found in In re T.W., that the then-existing parental notification
provision of the Florida abortion statute was unconstitutionally vague.116
The Court pointed to the fact that Article I § 23 of the Florida
Constitution specifically guarantees an independent right to privacy.117
The Court further determined that the words “every natural person” in
the aforementioned section included minors.118 Therefore, in order to
108
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interfere with a minor’s right to privacy, the State must show there is a
compelling state interest and that the means employed to reach its
objectives are the least restrictive.119 Additionally, the Court cited to Roe
v. Wade in which the Supreme Court of the United States recognized an
individual privacy right in decisions relating to “marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.”120
Holding that a minor woman’s right to an abortion prior to viability is a
protected privacy right, the Florida Supreme Court again cited to Roe v.
Wade, “[t]he decision whether to obtain an abortion is fraught with
specific physical, psychological, and economic implications of a
uniquely personal nature for each woman.”121 While a parental
notification provision continues to exist in Florida, there is a waiver
process through which pregnant minors may receive an abortion without
obtaining parental consent.122
Although the holding of In re T.W. may seem inapplicable to male
victims of statutory rape due to their biological inability to abort resultant
babies, much of the Court’s reasoning could carry over. Since the
Florida Constitution guarantees a privacy right123 that the Supreme Court
of the United States has held includes decisions regarding childrearing,124 and because there are “psychological and economic”
implications for teenage fathers,125 shouldn’t these male victims be
provided with at least one meaningful choice in these cases?
In Florida, a father may voluntarily relinquish his parental rights,
but only if certain conditions are met.126 Florida Statute § 39.806, which
deals with the termination of parental rights, allows for voluntary
termination if both parents sign the child over to the state or if someone
is willing to adopt the child.127 The statute also lists several reasons for
the State to terminate parental rights, but they largely apply to
involuntary termination and include offenses such as murder and
repeated child abuse.128 The statute does include some sexual battery
offenses as grounds for termination, but neither of the statutory rape
statutes are included.129 Under these conditions, a father would have to
119
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either convince the mother to also give up parental rights, hope the
mother finds a partner willing to adopt the child in his place, or engage in
egregious behavior in order to terminate his parental rights.130
Male victims’ rights are being practically ignored by Florida and
every other state that has ordered them to pay child support for the
resultant children. Statutes exist that are supposed to protect both female
and male victims,131 but in reality, when pregnancy results from statutory
rape, only female victims are being protected against the undesirable
ramifications.
V. RECOGNIZING THE RIGHTS OF MALE VICTIMS BY
PROVIDING A MEANINGFUL CHOICE
In order to balance the rights of all parties involved in cases where
female statutory rape offenders become pregnant as a result of the
offense, male victims should be given the option to terminate their
parental rights and responsibilities. This approach gives male victims an
option that is equivalent to those of abortion or adoption, which are
available to female victims in these scenarios. Although this option will
mean that the victims do not have to pay child support, it is not without
recompense, because they must also surrender any parental rights. The
right of the resultant child to financial support is not forsaken because if
the mother’s income does not exceed the state’s public assistance income
limits, they will still be supported through public assistance. In Florida, a
family can earn up to 200 percent of the federal poverty line (after
certain expenses such as child care and housing) and still be eligible to
receive food assistance.132
One opposition to this approach may be that it would cause the state
to be responsible for monetary support of the child. The fact that this
would be the outcome is not disputed; however, these cases are rare and
would represent a rather inconsequential percentage of the amount of
public assistance that is paid by states each year. For example, in the
2011-2012 fiscal year, Florida spent over twenty-four billion dollars on
public assistance and Medicaid.133 Since there is only one known case of
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a male victim of statutory rape being held liable for child support in
Florida,134 it is obvious that this one child would represent only an
infinitesimal percentage of the public assistance and Medicaid funds
Florida provides each year. Furthermore, with the limited earning
capacity of the adolescent male victims, it is unlikely that the child
support they are ordered to pay would be sufficient to exceed 200 percent
of the federal poverty guideline of $15,930 per year for a family of two135
in order to completely eliminate the need for public assistance funds.
Another possible argument against allowing male victims of
statutory rape the option to terminate their parental rights and
responsibilities is that it would allow all minor fathers to exercise this
choice. This result need not occur. This note proposes that this option
only be available when there is an instance of an adult woman who
engages in illicit sexual intercourse with a minor male and takes the
resultant pregnancy to term. This distinction is necessary and justifiable
because sexual activity between peers does not involve the same risks of
coercion or undue influence that exist in sexual activity between adults
and minors.136 As discussed previously, this distinction is already built
into the statutes that make these sexual encounters criminally punishable
in Florida and across the nation.137 This distinction should be codified in
an amendment to each state’s statute that addresses termination of
parental rights. The amendments should include the option for both male
and female victims to voluntarily relinquish parental rights and
responsibilities when a child is the product of intercourse, which violates
the applicable statutory rape provision. An enumerated clarification that
this option is not available when the mother and father were each under
the statutory age of consent should also be included. It is important to
note that allowing this option to be available to both male and female
victims presents another option to female victims who become pregnant.
This option could have the added benefit of allowing a resultant child the
opportunity of life with one of their biological parents, as opposed to
being aborted or losing both of his or her biological parents.

budget#Fiscal_year_2015 (last visited Dec. 1, 2015). (Florida’s total expenditures for the
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Giving male victims of statutory rape an option to avoid parenthood
will help address the inequalities between the treatment of male and
female victims of statutory rape who become parents. Without providing
some form of protection from the economic, social, and psychological
harm, which can be caused by male victimization, the statutory rape laws
are fundamentally powerless for adolescent males.
VI. CONCLUSION: IT IS TIME TO STOP SACRIFICING MALE
VICTIMS OF STATUTORY RAPE
The practice of holding male victims of statutory rape liable for
child support is reminiscent of the 1884 English case of The Queen v.
Dudley & Stevens. 138 In 1884, four men were stranded at sea in a
lifeboat.139 After twenty days, two of the men, Dudley and Stevens,
decided to kill and eat Parker, a seventeen or eighteen-year-old shipmate
who was already weak.140 Four days later, the remaining three men were
rescued.141 At the subsequent murder trial, the men contended that they
were in a perilous situation and would have died if they had not
sacrificed Parker.142 Likewise, in these statutory rape-child support cases,
the courts are in a lifeboat with two children and are deciding to sacrifice
the male victim. Dudley and Stevens’ choice to sacrifice a young man,
who was already weak, was morally and legally unacceptable in 1884,
and is an equally unacceptable choice for courts to make today. In
holding that there was no defense of necessity for murder, Lord
Coleridge said, “[i]t is not needful to point out the awful danger of
admitting the principle which has been contended for. Who is to be the
judge of this sort of necessity? By what measure is the comparative value
of lives to be measured? Is it to be strength, or intellect, or what?”143
Courts today, when holding male victims of statutory rape liable for child
support, are sending the message that the life of a male victim of
statutory rape is comparatively less valuable than the life of a child born
out of his victimization and that of a female statutory rape victim.
Despite the fact that most states now have gender-neutral statutory
rape laws based on the premise that minors are incapable of consent, and
despite the fact that the Florida Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court have adopted that belief, courts across the country have
decided that minor males are consenting to sex and, therefore, must pay.
138
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These courts are saying that thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen-year-old boys
are not victims when women who are twenty or even thirty-four years
old have illicit sex with them and become pregnant.
The idea that these male victims are “consenting” to sex is
contradictory to the statutory rape laws themselves. The Florida Supreme
Court has actually opined that “whatever ‘right’” children may have in
consenting to sexual exploitation is outweighed by the interest in
protecting them from “harmful physical and psychological effects of
which the child may be wholly unaware.”144 How can courts say that
children do not have a right to consent to sex, and then turn around and
say that a male victim of statutory rape consented to sex and, therefore,
must become a monetarily participating father? Scientific research has
shown that due to developmental differences, what may seem like
consent could actually be acquiescence or loss of control.145 This fact has
already been recognized in many areas of law throughout the civil and
criminal systems.
Teenage fatherhood can have real societal, behavioral, educational,
and economic consequences for these male victims. While female
victims have opportunities to avoid these ramifications, male victims
simply do not. Allowing male victims to terminate parental rights and
responsibilities would provide protection and justice where none
currently exists.
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